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Abstract 
Tradable bottleneck permits scheme proposed by Akamatsu et al. (2006) is one of the first-best pricing 
schemes and has been shown to be able to minimize social cost. Under the scheme, road administrators 
issue permits which allow permit holders to pass a bottleneck at specified times and create a market 
where drivers can freely trade the permits. However, the scheme is not always Pareto-improving such 
that it may harm some drivers. The objective of this study is to design Pareto-improving tradable 
bottleneck permits schemes for a V-shaped two-to-one merge bottleneck. Firstly, the paper formulates 
the morning commute model in the network and describes the arrival time choice equilibrium in the 
network with merging. Secondly, we show that the first-best pricing scheme under tradable bottleneck 
permits for this V-shaped network does not always achieve a Pareto improvement, with the cost of one 
group of drivers is increased by the permit pricing, a phenomena akin to the bottleneck paradox of 
Arnott et al. (1993). We propose therefore three implementations of tradable bottleneck permits for 
Pareto-improving: (i) merging priority rule is included in the tradable bottleneck permits scheme by 
creating different market for each origin; (ii) the permit revenues are refunded as monetary 
compensation to drivers whose cost is increased; and (iii) the permit revenues are used to expand 
bottleneck capacity. For each implementation, we derive their equilibrium solutions and demonstrate 
that a Pareto improvement is achieved and social cost is decreased by using the permit revenues for 
expanding the bottleneck capacity. 
 
Keywords: Social optimal pricing; Tradable Bottleneck Permits; Pareto improvement; Merging 
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1. Introduction 
Morning commute through traffic congestion to a central business district (CBD) is a common 
feature in cities around the world. The congestion is not caused so much by high travel demand but by 
a concentration of demand during a short (peak) period. Therefore, the congestion can be eliminated 
by an appropriate management to break up the demand among the longer time interval. 
The departure time choice equilibrium is considered to deal with such problems about the morning 
commute. (e.g. Vickley, 1969) Under the equilibrium, no drivers can improve their travel cost by 
unilaterally changing their behavior. There have been many studies about the departure time choice 
equilibrium with consideration of the drivers¶ heterogeneity (e.g. Arnott et al., 1988, 1992, 1994) and 
network shape (e.g. Kuwahara, 1990, Arnott et al. 1993). 
Congestion pricing is one of the management methods to control the traffic congestion. The 
congestion can be completely eliminated with an appropriate congestion charge, which is the same 
price as drivers would suffer waiting delay cost without pricing (Arnott et al., 1990a). One of the 
implementation methods to realize the social optimum is Tradable bottleneck permits (TBP) scheme 
(Akamatsu et al. 2006). 
On the other hand, there is a problem about equity, which is that some drivers get a benefit but 
others suffer a loss. One of the criterions for the equity is a Pareto improvement. The Pareto 
improvement is a property that a policy harms no one and helps at least one person. Therefore, no one 
is supposed to say any complains about a policy if it is Pareto improving. 
This study focuses on a merging bottleneck. The merging ratio from the upper reaches changes 
depending on the state at the merging point. When the merging point is saturated and queue occurs, 
the bottleneck capacity is allocated to the upper reaches. Before the pricing is implemented, the 
capacity allocation depends on the merging rule at the merging point; number of lanes, merging priority, 
and so on. After the pricing is implemented, on the other hand, the capacity allocation is determined 
by the toll, which eliminates the property of origins about merging priority. In this manner, the capacity 
allocation rule is changed by implementing the congestion pricing, and it may not be Pareto improving. 
The objectives of this study are to reveal that the optimal dynamic congestion pricing with tradable 
bottleneck permits (TBP) scheme at a merging section is not always Pareto improving and to propose 
TBP implementation for Pareto improving. We consider V-shaped merging network, which is the 
minimum unit network with a merging bottleneck. 
In Section 2, previous studies are reviewed. In Section 3, we describe the problem and provide 
the basic assumptions of the study. In Section 4, we formulate the equilibrium condition and derive 
the solution without pricing. In Section 5, we formulate the equilibrium condition and derive the 
solution with the first best-pricing by using TBP. We prove that the first-best pricing is not always 
Pareto improving in the V-shaped network. In Section 6, we propose three schemes to achieve a Pareto 
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improvement. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 7. 
 
2. Literature reviews 
 
2.1 Departure time choice 
Vickrey (1969) firstly modelled the peak hour behavior as a departure time choice with a trade-
off between schedule cost and congestion delay cost. Small (1982) applied the model to real data and 
estimated the values of delay and schedule costs. As the developed studies considering the more 
complicated network, the departure time choice equilibrium on a two-tandem bottleneck network was 
formulated by Kuwahara (1990). The study found that a queue may form at the upstream bottleneck 
as well as at the downstream bottleneck even though the demand of upstream group is lower than the 
upstream bottleneck capacity. The phenomenon is caused because the upstream drivers were forced to 
depart earlier than necessary once a queue forms at the downstream bottleneck. Arnott et al. (1993) 
formulated the equilibrium on the Y-shaped network and concluded that the social trip cost may 
increase even if the upper bottleneck capacity is increased, leading to a capacity paradox. The paradox 
means that decreasing inflows, for example by ramp metering, can be efficient to decreasing social 
cost by departure time choice as well as increase of bottleneck capacity at the merge point. Daniel et 
al. (2009) conducted a laboratory experiment and replicated the bottleneck paradox, considering with 
schedule delay as well as schedule early. Xiao et al. (2014) studied the Y-shaped network under a 
stochastic setting. They formulate the equilibrium departure-time patterns in a Y-shaped network with 
stochastic bottleneck capacity, and show that the uncertainty in bottleneck capacity increases 
FRPPXWHUV¶PHDn trip cost and lengthens the peak period, and the cost is sensitive to upstream traffic 
control mechanism. 
 
2.2 Congestion pricing 
In order to control the morning traffic congestion, road pricing has been considered as one of the 
efficient methods. The pricing scheme is based on the economic theory of marginal cost and is a 
mechanism to improve social benefit (Pigou 1920). An appropriately designed pricing scheme can 
increase social welfare. However, if the toll is inappropriately determined, road capacity may not be 
fully utilized, a queue at bottleneck may form and social welfare may decrease. Arnott et al. (1990a) 
derived a time-varying pricing scheme which can eliminate a queue at a bottleneck and realize social 
optimal state. However, it is difficult to apply this so-called ³first-best´ scheme because it requires 
perfect knowledge on driverV¶SUHIHUHQFHV (to the desired arrival time, schedule cost, delay cost and so 
on) in order to determine the appropriate time-varying tolls. As alternatives, second-best pricing 
schemes such as step toll have been proposed (e.g. Laih 1994, 2004; Lindsey et al. 2012). In order to 
determine the social optimal toll in the step toll schemes, information about the precise peak time 
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period during which congestion occurs without pricing, is still required. Recently, new pricing 
schemes based on market mechanism have emerged (Verhoef et al., 1997) which, in a road 
transportation system, propose to use tradable permits to pay for road transport externality. Tradable 
credit (TC) and tradable bottleneck permits (TBP) are two such pricing schemes; they were first 
proposed by Yang and Wang (2011) and Akamatsu et al. (2006) respectively. 
The study about TC was originally focused on mobility management. Xiao et al. (2013) extended 
it to departure time choice problem. See a review on the studies about TC in Grant-Muller and Xu 
(2014). The study of TBP was originally based on managing congestion including both route choice 
and departure time choice problems (Akamatsu et al. 2006). Both TC and TBP use market mechanism 
to determine price of credit or permit. A distinctive difference between TPB and TC is that in TBP 
schemes, the social optimal state can be achieved if only road administrator knows each bottleneck 
capacity. In TC schemes, market mechanism decides only the price of the credit and road administrator 
has to decide time-varying charging rate. In TBP schemes, on the other hand, bottleneck permits are 
issued for each pre-specifies time period, which means that demands for bottlenecks are quantitatively 
controlled, and drivers trade the permits in respective markets. It is proved that the charging price rates 
determined by market mechanism are the same as the social optimal charge rates (Akamatsu et al., 
2006). 
Take a simple one-to-one network (i.e. one origin to one destination) with a bottleneck for example. 
With TC, a road administrator issues certain number of credits, determines charging rate of the credits 
to pass the bottleneck in a specified time period, and creates a market where drivers can freely trade 
the credits. At equilibrium, the price of the credit and the flow rate at the bottleneck can be determined. 
If the number of credits issued and credit charge rate are properly set, the first-best time-varying 
pricing can be realized (Xiao et al. 2013). However, it is not easy to set them properly because 
information about driverV¶SUHIHUHQFHVZKLFKLVQRWHDVLO\REVHUYHGLVrequired to do so. 
With TBP, on the other hand, the road administrator issues bottleneck permits and creates markets 
whereby drivers can freely trade the permits. The permits are required for drivers to pass through the 
bottleneck at a specified time. The number of permits issued is equal to the bottleneck capacity. As a 
result, the price of the permit for each time is determined by market mechanism, which is equivalent 
to the toll of the first best pricing. Akamatsu (2007) proved that the equilibrium solution under the 
TBP scheme is the same as the solution of the social optimum traffic assignment. Therefore, the social 
cost can be minimized in a general network by using the TBP scheme. This study focuses on the 
equilibrium state realized by applying TBP, not on the process of trading the permits. One example of 
the process is discussed by Wada and Akamatsu (2013). 
 
2.3 Pareto improvement 
Even if the social optimal state can be realized by the first-best dynamic congestion pricing, it is 
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not always Pareto improving. It is Pareto improving if the scheme harms no one and helps at least one 
person. In economic theory, this property is called a Pareto improvement and is a necessary condition 
for a scheme to be adopted as a general policy. 
The Pareto improving schemes are categorized in two groups. The first one is using the revenues. 
Nie and Liu (2010) derived a condition that a Pareto improvement is achieved by self-financing under 
a situation in which drivers can choose to travel by either a car or public transport. As a result, the 
study proved that self-financing and a Pareto-improving toll scheme always exist when the value of 
time distribution function is concave. Yodoshi and Akamatsu (2008) studied the efficiency of the TBP 
in a network with two-tandem bottlenecks. They studied the usage of revenues for increasing 
bottleneck capacity and revealed the condition in which the TBP scheme is Pareto improving. The 
self-financing has been widely studied in the field of congestion pricing (e.g. Arnott et al., 1990b, Xiao 
et al., 2012). 
The second one is not using the revenues. Daganzo and Garcia (2000) showed Pareto improving 
pricing strategy by classifying drivers as either ³free´ or ³paying´ group. Song et al. (2014) applies 
road space rationing in addition to congestion pricing to achieve a Pareto improvement. Hall (2015) 
classified bottleneck capacity into ³tolled´ and ³free´ and showed the Pareto improvement can be 
practically achieved. The all of the studies take strategy of classification to achieve a Pareto 
improvement without using revenue. 
 
2.4 Positioning of this study 
In this study, we study congestion pricing in a two-to-one merge bottleneck from the aspect of 
Pareto improving. The two-to-one network has two aspects (shown in Fig. 1). One is a Y-shaped 
network (Fig. 1a) with two bottlenecks in tandem: one upstream of the merging point and one 
downstream of the merge. The other is a V-shaped network (Fig. 1b) with a single bottleneck at the 
point of merge. 
Lago and Daganzo (2007) studied the departure time equilibrium in a Y-shaped network, 
considering a physical queue with the effects of merge and spillover (Fig. 1a). This study focuses on 
the application of TPB in the V-shaped two-to-one network, and develops Pareto improving pricing 
schemes to manage bottleneck congestion at the merge point. In this study, we reveal the effect of the 
TBP at the merge bottleneck by showing firstly that the first-best pricing by TBP scheme is not always 
Pareto improving in the V-shaped merging network. We derive driverV¶ WULS cost before and after 
applying TBP market selling scheme. Secondly, we propose three TBP schemes to achieve a Pareto 
improvement.  
 
3. Problem statement 
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3.1 The merge network and model of merging behavior 
We consider morning commute in a V-shaped network shown in Fig. 1b. The network has two 
origins (A and B in Fig. 1b), one destination at CBD, and one bottleneck caused by merging at point 
M. The network is the simplest one which includes a merging bottleneck. The capacity of the 
bottleneck is µ. The number of drivers from origin A and B is NA and NB respectively. 
In the same way as Lago and Daganzo (2007), this study employs the capacity allocation rules 
proposed by Daganzo (1996), which are shown in Fig. 2. The rule derives a relationship between 
discharge flows from both upstream links AM and BM. The discharge flows from each approach, {xA, 
xB}, satisfy the following conditions: (i) the sum of the discharge flows should never exceed the 
available merge capacity, i.e. Pd BA xx ; and (ii) when a queue exists on approach r, the share of 
capacity used by this approach should be 
or B A     ,
BA
 t rxx
x
r
r D ,                        (1) 
where Įr is a µµPHUJH-priority´ constant. These constants satisfy: 
1BA  DD ,                                  (2) 
10 A ddD ,                                  (3) 
10 B ddD .                                  (4) 
It follows from (2) that when both approaches are queued, we have the following relationship: 
B
A
B
A
D
D 
x
x
.                                   (5) 
 
3.2 DriverV¶arrival-time behavior 
Based on the most popular bottleneck model formulated by Vickrey (1969), we assume that each 
driver chooses arrival time t so as to minimize their trip cost. In this study, for convenience, the free 
flow travel times are assumed to be zero. The trip cost is then defined as the summation of the 
following three component costs: i) price of a permit (toll); ii) cost of schedule early/late, defined as 
the difference between desired arrival time and the actual arrival time; and iii) queueing delay cost. 
Therefore, drivers solve the following optimal problem: 
   ^ `  ^ `  tptsftwftTC
t
 sw   min ,                        (6) 
where t is the actual arrival time to CBD, TC(t) is the trip cost to a driver who arrives at time t, p(t) is 
the price of a permit to arrive at time t, fs{.} is the schedule cost function, s(t) is the schedule delay for 
a driver who arrives at time t; s(t)=t0-t, t0 is the desired arrival time, fw{.} is the queuing delay cost 
function, and w(t) is the queueing delay for a driver who arrives at time t. In this study, the time 
departing the bottleneck is regard as arrival time t. 
We assume that all drivers have the same desired arrival time, schedule cost function, and 
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queueing delay cost function. Schedule cost function and queueing delay cost function are defined as 
linear functions as follows: 
^ ` ®¯­ 
t 
0
0
2
1
s
ssc
ssc
sf ,                            (7) 
^ ` bwwf  w ,                                 (8) 
where c1 is the marginal cost of schedule early, c2 is the marginal cost of schedule delay, and b is the 
marginal cost of queueing delay time. 
We assume that the number of drivers to merging priority ratio from A is larger than that from B, 
i.e. 
B
B
A
A
DD
NN ! .                                (9) 
This means that group B drivers have an advantage and can cut into the queues formed by group A 
drivers. This assumption is to simplify the problem. If we considered the opposite condition of Eq. (9), 
the relation between A and B can be simply swapped due to the symmetrical nature of the network 
considered. 
 
4. Equilibrium condition and solution without pricing 
In this section, we formulate the equilibrium conditions and derive the solutions for the basic 
problem described in the previous section, without any pricing intervention. 
 
4.1 Equilibrium conditions 
We consider four conditions here. 
(1) Equilibrium conditions for arrival time choice: 
At equilibrium, no one can improve his or her own generalized trip cost by changing the bottleneck 
departing time unilaterally. Therefore, if someone chooses an arrival time t, the generalized trip cost 
to that driver is equal to the equilibrium cost. On the contrary, if no one chooses arrival time t, the cost 
at that time is larger than the cost at equilibrium. The equilibrium condition for the driver¶VDUULYDO
time choice can be expressed as: 
t
txTCtTC
txTCtTC °¯
°®­  t
! 
0)(if)(
0)(if)(
A
*
AA
A
*
AA
,                      (10) 
t
txTCtTC
txTCtTC °¯
°®­  t
! 
0)(if)(
0)(if)(
B
*
BB
B
*
BB
,                      (11) 
where TCA(t) and TCB(t) is the generalized trip cost to a group A and group B driver respectively who  
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arrives at destination at time t, TCA* and TCB* is the generalized trip cost to group A and group B 
respectively at equilibrium, xA(t) and xB(t) is the flow rate of group A and group B respectively exiting 
from bottleneck at time t (i.e. the outflow rate of group A and B arriving at CBD). 
 
(2) Demand-performance equilibrium at bottleneck: 
At equilibrium, if a queue forms at the bottleneck (i.e. the waiting time at the bottleneck is 
positive), then the bottleneck is considered to be saturated and the exit flow rate from bottleneck is 
equal to the bottleneck capacity. On the contrary, if the waiting time is zero, the arrival flow rate is 
less than the capacity: 
®¯­   d
!! 
t
twtwtxtx
twtwtxtx
0)(and0)(if)()(
0)(or0)(if)()(
BABA
BABA
P
P
.          (12) 
(3) Flow conservation for OD flow rates and OD travel demand: 
OD travel demand for each origin has to be assigned in any time intervals. 
 ³  fAs
A
AA d
t
t
Nttx ,                             (13) 
 ³  fBs
B
BB d
t
t
Nttx .                             (14) 
where tAs and tAf denote the start and the finish time of the departure-time period for group A 
commuters, and tBs and tBf those of the group B commuters. 
 
(4) Merging constraint: 
If queues form in both links AM and BM, the merging proportion is defined by the priority rules 
at the merging point. Therefore, the merging constraint is derived as follows: 
        ttwtwtxtx !!  0 ,0ifand BABBAA PDPD .        (15) 
 
4.2 Equilibrium solution 
Let I(t) and O(t) represent the accumulative number of drivers arriving at the bottleneck merge 
and those exited the merge respectively at time t. It is noted that the slope of arrival curves, IA and IB, 
is 1/ĮA, 1/ĮB times the actual entering flow rate when both groups are flowing. At equilibrium, queue 
occurring intervals are different between two groups. The details of the equilibrium solution are 
following (see Lago and Daganzo 2007): 
21
2BA
0
s
A
cc
cNN
tt 
 P ,                      (16) 
21
2
B
B
0
s
B
cc
cN
tt  PD ,                        (17) 
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21
1
B
B
0
f
B
cc
cN
tt  PD ,                         (18) 
21
1BA
0
f
A
cc
cNN
tt 
 P ,                       (19) 
 
°°
°°
¯
°°
°°
®
­
d


d
¹¸
·
©¨
§ 
¹¸
·
©¨
§ 
 


otherwise
for
for
0
1
1
d
d f
A
21
21BA
0
21
21BA
0
s
A
1
2
1
1
A tt
cc
cc
b
NN
t
cc
cc
b
NN
ttt
b
c
b
c
t
tI
P
P
P
P
,               (20) 
 
°°
°°
¯
°°
°°
®
­
d¹¸
·
©¨
§ 
d¹¸
·
©¨
§ 
 


otherwise                      0       
for      1
for      1
d
d f
B
21
21
B
B
0
1
2
21
21
B
B
0
s
B
1
1
B tt
cc
cc
b
N
t
b
c
cc
cc
b
N
ttt
b
c
t
tI
PDP
PDP
,                  (21) 
  ®¯­ d 
otherwise
for
0d
d fA
s
ABA ttt
t
tO P
,                  (22) 
And trip cost to each group is derived as follows: 
P
BA
21
21*
A
NN
cc
ccTC  ,                          (23) 
PDB
B
21
21*
B
N
cc
ccTC  .                            (24) 
The trip cost to group B drivers is less than that to group A drivers because group B drivers have 
the merging priority and can cut into a queue formed by group A drivers at equilibrium. 
 
5. Equilibrium under TBP scheme 
In this section, we formulate the equilibrium conditions and derive the solution with TBP scheme. 
Under the TBP scheme, the number of issued bottleneck permits is equal to the bottleneck capacity, 
and the permits are freely traded by drivers. As a result, the price of the permits is determined equal 
to the first best time-varying toll. The following shows that the pricing is not always Pareto improving. 
 
5.1 Equilibrium conditions 
As described in Section 4.1, without TBP scheme, four conditions were valid. Under TBP scheme, 
10 
 
on the other hand, there are only three valid conditions. The first one is the equilibrium condition for 
permit choice, which is corresponding to the equilibrium condition for arrival time choice. The second 
one is the demand-supply equilibrium conditions in permit markets, which is corresponding to the 
demand-supply equilibrium condition at bottleneck. The third one is flow conservation between flow 
rate and demand, which is the same as that without any pricing. The merging constraint is not valid 
under TBP scheme because no queues form at the merge bottleneck and the merging interaction, which 
is valid when the merging point is saturated, is eliminated. 
 
(1) Equilibrium condition for permit choice: 
At equilibrium state, no one can improve his or her own generalized trip cost by unilaterally 
changing their permit, which is equivalent to changing their arrival time. Therefore, the equilibrium 
condition is the same as that without pricing; hence Eqs. (10) and (11) also apply here. 
 
(2) Demand-supply equilibrium (market clearing) conditions in a permit market: 
At equilibrium, if the price of a certain time of permit is positive, the quantities supplied and the 
quantities demanded for the permit are equal; for the permit whose supply quantity exceeds the 
quantity demanded, the price is zero: 
t
tptxtx
tptxtx ®¯­  d
! 
0)(if)()(
0)(if)()(
BA
BA
P
P
.                   (25) 
 
(3) Flow conservation for flow rate and travel demand: 
The flow conservation for each driver group is the same as that without pricing; hence conditions 
(13) and (14) also apply here. 
 
5.2 Equilibrium solution procedure 
The following shows the procedure to get the equilibrium solution. From Eqs. (10) and (11), the 
necessary condition where a drivers choose time t as an arrival time can be derived that the derivative 
of generalized trip cost is equal to zero: 
or B A   ,0   w
w
r
t
TCr
 (26) 
Substitute Equations (6), (7), and (8) for Eq. (26), 
°°¯
°°®
­
 
t 
0      when0
0      when0
2
1
s
dt
dp
dt
ds
c
dt
dwb
s
dt
dp
dt
ds
c
dt
dwb
 (27) 
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Under the TBP scheme where the number of bottleneck permits is equal to bottleneck capacity, queue 
does not occur. This means: 
0 w
w
t
w
. (28) 
Therefore, the condition where a driver chooses time t as arrival time can be derived as: 
®¯­ 
t 
0      when
0      when
2
1
sc
sc
dt
dp
 (29) 
This means that the gradient of bottleneck permits price is derived as marginal cost of schedule delay. 
On the other hand, the start and finish time of arriving is calculated by the following. From 
Expressions (13), (14), and (25), required time for all drivers¶ demand to pass through bottleneck is: 
P
N
tt   fs  (30) 
At equilibrium, all drivers minimize their trip cost, and generalized trip cost is always constant if 
at least one driver chooses time t as arrival time. This means: 
   fs rrrr tTCtTC   (31) 
Under the TBP scheme, queuing delay time is always zero. In addition that, the price of bottleneck 
permits is zero at the start and finish time. Therefore, it should be satisfied that: 
   fsss tftf   (32) 
From Equations (31) and (32), we can obtain ts and tf. 
 
5.3 Equilibrium solution 
This section describes equilibrium solution under the conditions in Section 5.1. The proof of 
uniqueness of the solution is provided in Appendix A. Under TBP scheme, inflow rate becomes the 
same as the bottleneck capacity and queue does not form. The solution is shown in Fig. 4. The inflow 
starting time of both group drivers becomes same, so we derive it simply as follows: 
21
2BA
0
ss
B
s
A
cc
cNN
tttt 
 { P ,                   (33) 
21
1BA
0
ff
B
f
A
cc
cNN
tttt 
 { P .                   (34) 
    ®¯­ d  
otherwise
for
0d
d
d
d fsBABA ttt
t
tI
t
tO P
                 (35) 
The RHSs of Eqs. (33) and (34) are the same as those of Eqs. (16) and (19), which means that 
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application of TBP does not change the time period when the bottleneck capacity is fully used. The 
result shows that the bottleneck capacity is shared by group A and B fairly and trip costs to both groups 
become same. 
P
BA
21
21*
A
NN
cc
ccTC                           (36) 
P
BA
21
21*
B
NN
cc
ccTC                           (37) 
This is the same as the solution for a one-to-one commuter problem with one-bottleneck, and 
NA+NB drivers. 
The revenues of TBP, assumed to be represented by R, can be calculated as: 
ttxtpttxtpR
t
t
t
t
d)()(d)()(
f
B
s
B
f
A
s
A
BA ³³                      (38) 
At the equilibrium, the revenues are 
 
P
2
BA
21
21
2
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5.4 Comparison between before and after the TBP pricing applied 
Comparing the results without pricing and those with TBP schemes, we can derive the changes in 
trip cost to the two groups of drivers and revenues as follows: 
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There is no change in trip cost to group A drivers because they pay in TBP the equivalent of the 
queueing delay cost without pricing. On the other hand, the trip cost to group B is increased with the 
introduction of TBP scheme. The reason is that the arrival time interval of group B drivers under TBP 
scheme becomes wider, and as such, they now have to pay in TBP more than the queueing delay cost 
without pricing. This phenomenon is based on the bottleneck paradox by Arnott et al. (1993). Without 
pricing, group B can decrease their trip cost by cutting into the queue formed by group A and not 
increasing trip cost to group A. However, after the congestion is eliminated by the pricing, this effect 
is also eliminated. Akamatsu et al. (2006) state that the price of the permits corresponds to queueing 
delay cost. However, the above results show that this relation is not always satisfied in a merging 
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network. 
 
6. TBP implementations for a Pareto improvement 
In the previous section, we show that the application of TBP to the merge bottleneck is not always 
Pareto improving because the cost to group B drivers is increased by the permit pricing. For any pricing 
scheme to be politically acceptable, it is reasonable to expect that the scheme achieves a Pareto 
improvement, i.e. it harms no one and helps at least one person. 
In this section, we propose three schemes to be Pareto improving with TBP at the merging section. 
The three schemes are that: (1) differentiated permits are issued for each driver group; (2) revenues 
are rebated in cash as compensation; and (3) revenues are used to finance expansion of the bottleneck. 
Scheme 1 does not use the TBP revenues. Schemes 2 and 3 use the revenues. 
 
6.1 Differentiated permit (Scheme 1) 
In this scheme, TBP revenues are not rebated to drivers and remain with the road administrator. 
In order to achieve a Pareto improvement in this way, the arrival time period of each group must not 
be changed between with and without pricing so as not to increase the trip cost to any drivers. The 
road administrator issues bottleneck permits for each group without changing the arrival time range 
of the groups. The scheme is equivalent to placing the pricing point to the upstream of the merge. 
Under the previous section¶Vassumptions, the solution of the permit allocation is shown in Table 1. 
The allocation rate can be determined by the discharge flow of each group at equilibrium without 
pricing. 
 
6.1.1 Equilibrium conditions and solution 
In the scheme, the equilibrium conditions about demand-performance in permit markets are 
derived as follows: 
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Under these conditions, the discharge flow rate of each group becomes the same as shown in Fig. 
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3(a), where the congestion is eliminated by TBP. That means each driver pays in TBP equivalent to 
the queueing delay cost without pricing. This is because permit markets are severally created for group 
A and group B, which eliminates the interaction of two groups in the markets. 
The revenues in this case are equal to the total delay cost without pricing because drivers pay in 
TBP as equivalent to their delay cost. 
 
6.1.2 Pareto improvement 
Comparing the drivers¶ costs and the TBP revenues between with and without pricing, we show 
how the scheme is Pareto improving. Table 2 shows the cost to each group and revenues of the road 
administrator under the different schemes. Without pricing, the costs are given in equations (23) and 
(24), and no revenue is generated. With scheme 1, the costs to the drivers are not changed by the 
pricing (e.g. equations (23)) because the drivers pay in TBP equivalent to the queueing delay cost 
without pricing. On the other hand, revenues remain in road administrators, which would be spent as 
queueing delay cost if the pricing were not applied. Therefore, the scheme is Pareto improving. 
 
6.2 Monetary compensation (Scheme 2) 
In this scheme, revenues are spent as compensation to drivers whose trip cost is increased by the 
effect of the pricing. In Scheme 1, TBP price was controlled by creating TBP market for individual 
group and the price of TBP become equivalent to the queueing delay cost without pricing. In Scheme 
2, on the other hand, derivers will be paid back after first paying to get TBP whose price may be more 
expensive than the queueing delay cost without pricing. 
In order to achieve a Pareto improvement under the scheme, the road administrator should pay 
back as much as the increase of the cost to the cost-increased drivers. Under the conditions in Section 
3, the compensation amount for a driver in each group is determined equivalent to the increase of cost 
shown in Eqs. (40) and (41): 
Compensation for group A:  0 
Compensation for group B:  ¸¸¹
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6.2.1 Equilibrium conditions and solution 
The equilibrium conditions are the same as formulated in Section 5.1 because the compensations 
are paid ex post facto. Therefore, the equilibrium solutions are also same as derived in Section 5.2. 
However, group B drivers can get the compensation that is equivalent to the cost added by the 
application of TBP. 
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6.2.2 Pareto improvement 
The costs and revenues are the same as those under Scheme 1 because the increased cost to group 
B is rebated from the revenues. With Scheme 2, road administrators pay back to group B drivers less 
than they pay in TBP. Therefore, this implementation is also Pareto improving. 
 
6.3 Finance expansion of bottleneck (Scheme 3) 
In this scheme, the road administrators spend revenue generated by the bottleneck permits on 
expanding bottleneck capacity. Yodoshi and Akamatsu (2008) studied the scheme for a straight 
network with two-tandem bottlenecks. Capacity expansion subject to minimizing social cost to all 
drivers is an optimization problem. Below, we firstly formulate the optimal problem as a minimization 
problem of social cost. Secondly, we explain the equilibrium solution, and finally, we show the 
requirement for Pareto improving. 
We decide how much bottleneck capacity should be increased to minimize the social cost. The 
best capacity improvement 'µ* is given by minimizing social cost which consists of the cost for 
improving the bottleneck capacity and the sum of driverV¶VFKHGXOHFRVW. Assuming that the bottleneck 
capacity is improved when starting the pricing with TPB, we derive the present social cost with the 
discount rate r. The minimization problem is derived as: 
     PPPP ǻK
r
ǻTSǻSC  min ,                  (46) 
0s.t . tPǻ , 
where SC is the social cost, 'µ is the capacity increase, TS is the total schedule cost, and K is the 
capacity increasing cost. 
K is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to 'µ: 
  PP ǻmǻK  ,                              (47) 
where m is the marginal cost of increasing bottleneck capacity. 
From the expressions (46) and (47), the optimality conditions can be derived as: 
 
 °°¯
°°®
­
 !
! 
0if0
d
d1
0if0
d
d1
PP
PP
ǻmǻ
TS
r
ǻmǻ
TS
r
.                      (48) 
Total schedule cost (TS) is calculated by multiplying the triangles area formed by fs in Fig. 3 and 
the departure rates: 
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From the expression (48) and (49), the optimal amount of capacity increase is derived as: 
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This means that the optimal bottleneck capacity always exists and that it relates to the number of 
commuters, marginal costs of schedule delays, marginal cost for capacity-increase, and the discount 
rate. The optimal bottleneck capacity µ* is therefore: 
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cc  P .                        (51) 
In order to achieve the minimum social cost, the road expansion only needs to increase the 
difference between the optimal capacity and the present capacity. If the present bottleneck capacity is 
larger than the optimal capacity, the road expansion is not needed. The optimal road expansion can 
always be realized within the revenues of the bottleneck permits. (See appendix A for the proof)  
 
6.3.1 Equilibrium 
In scheme 3, the bottleneck capacity is expanded to the optimal capacity µ*. The cost at 
equilibrium is derived by replacing the bottleneck capacity in Eqs. (36) and (37) for the optimal 
capacity. 
 
6.3.2 Pareto improvement 
The changes in revenues without pricing and with Scheme 3 are shown in Table 2. The scheme 
decreases the cost to group A drivers and increases the revenues of the bottleneck permits, but the cost 
to group B drivers is not always decreased. 
A Pareto improvement can be achieved if the change in cost for group B drivers is not positive. 
The condition for the Pareto improvement is derived as: 
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The LHS of (52) is the trip cost to group B in the scheme. The RHS is the trip cost to group B without 
any pricing. Substituting eq. (51) for expression (52) and solving the expression for m, we get the 
following condition: 
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Therefore, a Pareto improvement can be achieved if the marginal capacity-expansion cost m 
satisfies (53), i.e. is less than a value determined by the number of group B commuters, present 
bottleneck capacity, marginal costs of schedule delay, and the discount rate. 
 
6.4 Comparison and discussion 
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In this section, we compare the schemes studied in the paper and state the features of each. Table 
3 presents a summary of the proposed schemes. It can be seen that, from the perspective of social cost 
minimization, scheme 3 is the most effective because the scheme increases bottleneck capacity and 
total schedule cost of drivers is reduced. However, the scheme is not always Pareto improving. On the 
other hand, Schemes 1 and 2 can always achieve a Pareto improvement. Scheme 1 controls the 
bottleneck permits allocation for each group separately without changing the discharge flow rates of 
respective group between before and after applying TBP. The scheme has an advantage that it is 
available only by observing the discharge flow rates of respective groups. Scheme 2 is reasonable to 
conduct because the procedure is only compensation, which can be realized for example by 
discounting the charge rate of bottleneck permits. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study focuses a merging section and reveals the effect of the social optimal pricing scheme 
that is implemented with TBP. The feature of a merge bottleneck is that the capacity allocation for 
each upstream link depends on the congestion state at the merging point. If the both upstream links 
are congested and queues form, the capacity at merging is determined by the merging priority rules. 
The paper shows that the TBP pricing is not always Pareto improving at the merge bottleneck 
because the pricing eliminates the priority rules at the merging. The mechanism is that the pricing by 
using TBP eliminates a physical queue at the bottleneck but the prices of the permits are determined 
by a length of imaginary point queue at the bottleneck, which is actually not formed at bottleneck. 
This fact relates to the bottleneck paradox identified by Kuwahara (1990) and Arnott et al. (1990a). 
The paper proposes three TBP schemes to be Pareto improving. The first one is that differentiated 
permits are issued for each driver group so as that TBP revenues are not returned in cash or services 
to drivers. In this scheme, each driver pays in TBP equivalent to his/her queueing delay cost which 
was generated without the TBP pricing. As a result, TBP revenues remain in the road administrator 
and that is Pareto improving. The second one is that revenues are rebated in cash as compensation. 
The scheme resulted in that the cost and revenues were the same as those under the first scheme. The 
last one is that revenues are used to finance expansion of the bottleneck. The good point of the third 
scheme is that the social cost decreases more than only applying TBP at the bottleneck. However, a 
Pareto improvement is sometimes not achieved, for example, in case that construction cost is high, 
social discount rate is high, and bottleneck capacity is already enough. 
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Appendix A: Proving uniqueness of equilibrium solution under TBP scheme 
Appendix A proves the following proposition. 
Proposition: On the assumption that all drivers have the same linear generalized trip cost function, if 
the equilibrium solution exists under the TBP scheme, it is unique. 
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Proof: According to Iryo et al. (2005) and Iryo and Yoshii (2007), there is an optimization problem 
whose solution is the equilibrium solution. The optimization problem is to minimize the all drivers¶ 
total schedule cost of delay time unit. Under the equilibrium conditions derived in Section 5.1, the 
equivalent optimization problem is derived as: 
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With the assumptions that schedule cost function is linear, the form of optimization problem (A1) with 
constraints (A2) is completely linear. Therefore, if the problem has a solution, it is unique. 
 
Appendix B: Condition where the optimal road expansion can be self-financed (financed only 
by the revenues from the bottleneck permits) 
The condition that the optimal road expansion cost is covered by the revenue of TBP is derived as: 
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where R is the revenues of TBP in a day, and r is social discount rate. The revenue can be calculated 
by eq. (31) and derived as: 
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The RHS of equation (B2) is the same as that of equation (42) because of the linear assumption on the 
schedule cost and queueing delay cost. Substitute Eqs. (40) and (B2) for condition (B1), 
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Substitute Eq. (43) for condition (B3), 
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Divide both sides of condition (B4) by m (>0) and we can get 
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Therefore, the condition where the road expansion cost can be covered by TBP is derived as: 
0tP ,                                   (B6) 
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which means that the optimal road expansion can always be realized within the TBP revenues. 
 
